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Governance has gone through radical changes over the last twenty five years. Seemingly, it became one
of the important strategies, processes, methods and mechanisms in governing countries to achieve economic
development goals. The objective of this paper is to observe the local economic governance dynamics in
the case of districts/municipalities in Indonesia. First, the dynamics behavior of local governance over time
is analyzed by visual inspection of their non-parametric density distribution. More deeply, we use Markov
chains to predict a pattern of change in local economic governance toward its steady state. Based on
comparison between 2007 and 2011 data delivered by Commission of Regional Autonomy Implementation
Watch, we conclude that there is a high level of persistence in the relative position of local governance
index, consistent with a low degree of mobility in the index distribution implying the implementation of
governance in the districts/municipalities in Indonesia is weak enough. This finding implies that the local
economic governance is a key to achieve sustainable regional economic growth in line with fiscal
decentralization and regional autonomy.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Regional developmentis essentially an integral part of the national development. The regional
development is directed to achieve the national targets that are adjusted to the potential,
aspirations, and problems of development in the region. Therefore, the achievement of the
national developmentis a shared responsibility among the central, provincial, and district/
municipalities governments so that the national development is asynergic aggregation of the
regional development performance (Hariyoga, 2009).
Within that framework, since 2001 the government of Republic of Indonesia has been
implementing the fiscal decentralization and regional autonomy policies. Those policies are
based onthe fact that a broad area such Indonesia which each region has variety conditions
and specific economic potencies. Within the fiscal decentralization and regional autonomy
policies, the regions are expected to develop local economic potencies more effectively and
efficiently (Kuncoro, 2005).
In macroeconomic perspective, the potency of those local economies is a necessity for
national strategy in order to improve the quality of national economic growth. In principle,
the local economic potencies engage the regional and bottom-up approaches, which in turn
could be a correction for industrial approach which had been used by the previous regime. In
addition, the majority ofeconomic actors are small and medium enterprises reaching 44.7
million people or 99.9 percent of the total employment in Indonesian manufacturing industry
and they are local resources basis. Thus, the local economies potencies can overcome the
problem of unemployment, poverty, andimprove the national economic resilience (Sebayang
and Kuncoro, 2011).
The success of the local economic potencies will depend on the regions in structuring
and managing their own localities, including improving the investment climate and attracting
investors within the fiscal, political, and administration decentralizations frameworks (Mahi,
2009). The average of regional economic growth in the decentralization period performed
an improvement. However, relative to the decentralization (e.g. the period 1993-1996) the
economic growth after the decentralization was still lower. The decentralization also spawned
the growth of regions is relatively high, compared to the national average; however, some
areas require the acceleration of growth (Lewis, 2003). In the second half of 2000s, the
regional economic growth and income distribution across locality relatively remain unchanged
(Figure 1 and 2).
Those facts confirm the necessity of local government behavior changes to facilitate
local economic potencies in order to achieve the sustainable living standard improvement
(Kaufmann etal.,2005; Knack,2003). This paper would like to examine the dynamics of local
economic governance in the case of districts / municipalities in Indonesia. This paper will
begin with are view of the relevant literature regarding the governance. This is followed by
exploring the empirical evidence concerning the influence of governance on the local economic
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performance. The assessment data for Indonesia is  placed in the next section. Finally, some
concluding remarks are drawn.
II.  THEORY
Political economics literature offers a huge intrepretations regarding governance which nowadays
is still in process to reach a general concensus. Broadly speaking, governance is defined as the
traditions and institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a country (Kaufmann et
al., 2000).  Weiss (2005) noted that governance is related to strategies, processes, methods,
and mechanisms in governing countries and achieving public demand and interest.
Weiss (2005) further explained that good governance has been associated with
democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, with the rule of law, and with efficient
public services. Governance also involves the interaction between formal institutions publicly
and privately and those of civil society.Similarly, Chibba (2009) pointed out that governance
matters have been an integral part of societies since the dawn of civilization, and especially so
with respect to what values, ethics and rules of conduct, and justice should be upheld, how
societies should be organized, and who should hold power and authority.
Some definitions above are complementary with each other and clearly propose the
same basic idea of governance. However, theyare still in the area of political science, i.e. have
less economic meaning. In the context of economics, Dixit (2001) pointed out that economic
governance consists of the processes that support economic activity and economic transactions
by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to provide
appropriate physical and organizational infrastructure.Tong (2011) simply defined governance
quality as the capacity of a government to internalize externality. Even though the Dixits» and
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Tongs» definitionsare still general, they providea useful starting point to explore the more detail
concepts.
Other scholars have narrowed the lens somewhat, disentangling governance into
separateconcepts, such as corruption (Wei, 2000), transparency (Kaufmann et al., 2000),
regulation (Djankov, et al., 2002), and public goods provision (Kaufmann et al., 2005), that
each themselves still contain a number of different policy levers and types of interactions.
Other scholars have taken a micro perspective where individual policies such as business
registration procedures have been isolated and explored separately from other modes of
governance in society (see:for instance Helpman (2008) for several recent studies).
Based on some extended interpretations above, one important thing that could  be inferred
isthat the government»s capability in managing its administration will bring a critical impact on
all economic agents» activities. Even though the concept of governance is not new, it is as old
as human civilization, unfortunately, this factoris considered to be given intraditional neoclassical
economic growth model, as in the proposition of Solow (1956), Cass(1965), and Koopmans
(1965) (see: Romer, 1996). The endogenous growth theory proposed by Romer (1986;1990)
and Lucas (1988) tried  to incorporate the factors of innovation without explaining how and
where the innovation can be created. The technological innovation can only becreated  because
of institutional environment.
A link connecting among institution, governance, and economic performance has been
a subject of intense discussion for the last 25 years. The seminal work of North (1981) could be
considered as pioneer the emerging idea of government capability inducement. According to
North (1981) institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. The constraints would affect through
incentives (North, 1990). In this circumstance, the incentive is understood as conditioning the
willingness of economic actors to accept the rule of the game.
Since that, a numerous economists develop the North»s idea in creating incentive in order
to promote economic growth using different perspectives. In principle, they have the same
objectives, i.e. reducing uncertainly and promoting efficiency. The New Political Economy, for
example, argued the need of structural adjustment programs by remove the incentives for rent
seeking and corruption (Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975; Bhagwati, 1982; Bardhan, 1984; Colander,
1984; Alt and Shepsle, 1990; Lal and Myint, 1996; Bates, 2001).
In line with the New Political Economy, the New Institutional Economy (initiated by
Williamson, 1975; 1985) had brought to the fore economic theories thatidentified governance
capabilities that states needed to have to create the conditionsfor low transaction cost (efficient)
markets.In principle, the New Institutional Economics emphasized the importance of market-
enhancing government throughcontracts enforcement and property rights protection.In short,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005)concluded that good government governance is a
fundamental cause of long run economic growth.
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Although there is no governance without government, governance cannot be judged
solely on outcomes but must also consider the processes and relationships that produce them,
however. More operationally, some expert teams develop indices to accommodate various
concepts of the economic governance above (for example Knack and Keefer, 1995, 1997;
Kaufmann et al.,1999, and Kaufmann et al.,2005). World Bank (2005) recently summarized
them into six broad governance indicators. These are:
1. Voice and Accountability ƒ measuring political, civil, and human rights
2. Political Instability and Violence ƒ measuring the likelihood of violent threats to, or changes
in, government, including terrorism
3. Government Effectiveness ƒ measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality
of public service delivery
4. Regulatory Burden ƒ measuring the incidence of market-unfriendly policies
5. Rule of Law ƒ measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
6. Control of Corruption ƒ measuring the exercise of public power for private gain, including
both petty and grand corruption and state capture.
The six indicators above suggest that governance quality is a complex notion. It can take
many forms and there may be trade-off between different dimensions of governance.As noted
by Tong (2011), however, good governance is often loosely described as effective government,
which is a broad and multi-dimensional concept itself. Various widely used governance indicators
do not provide an all-encompassing definition. Thomas (2007) describes the various indicators
as a result of the mixed ≈personal ideas of governance∆ put forward by people developing
them. Quibria (2006) points out that governance is often ≈used as an umbrella concept to
federate a whole assortment of different, albeit related, ideas∆.
Regardless the different dimensions of governance, the convergence of those different
perspectives led to the emergence of a set of policy priorities for governance that has come to
be known as the good governance agenda.Empirical studies regarding the good governance
have been conducted widely. In general, they support to close correlation or even causal
relationship between institutional governance and economic performance.
In the cross-country level, some determining factors which have been identified in particular
researches are property rights and entrepreneurial activity (Galiani and Scargrodsky, 2006; Di
Tella, 2007; Fields, 2007; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005;and Malesky and Taussig, 2009). Mengistu
and Adhikary  (2011) considered good governance as a key determinant for foreign investors
to invest their fund in the case of Asian countries.
Other scholars have devised clever sub-national analyses of the impact of corruption on
economic behavior (Fisman, 2001; Golden and Picci, 2005; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003;and
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Olken, 2007), the importance of state-business relations (Cali, 2009) as well as the predictability
of corruption (Malesky and Samphantharak, 2008).Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) show that better
contract enforcement institutions increase the share of entrepreneurs that identify themselves
as growth-oriented. Using variance in institutions across provinces in Mexico, Laeven and
Woodruff (2007) find a significant relationship between better contracting institutions and
higher levels of growth in firm size.
Most studies above have focused on cross-country data which differ from Indonesia that
has a unique economic characteristics and culture. According to Lewis (2003), the economic
performance of Indonesia»s districts since decentralization in 2001 has varied dramatically. Some
districts have seen steady economic progress, strong investment, and job creation. But many
others have lagged behind, failing to share in overall economic growth. Moreover, there is
evidence that the policies pursued by sub-national authorities have had an important bearing
on the quality of the local investment climate (Lewis 2003).
Kuncoro and Suryanto (2003) found that there was a high level of persistence in the
relative position of regional income, consistent with a low degree of mobility in the income
distribution. The richest regions tend to polarize gradually, which may be attributed to externalities
linked to localization or to the proximity the rest of Java. Pepinsky and Wihardja (2009) also
suggest that divergent economic performance across districts/municipalities is driven by
heterogeneity in endowments, factor immobility, and institutional quality. Those findings confirm
to study of Mahi (2009).He found that even though the geographical concentration of industries
gradually decreased (especially in Java and Bali) after decentralization, it has a bad impact on
the regional economic development equality. He also found that investment climate played an
important role in the geographical concentration.
Istiandari (2009) assessed the local economic governance and related it to regional income
as well as poverty rate. According to her study, most regions in Java had a higher governance
rate to provide a positive impact on welfare. She also found that there was a large disparity of
governance implementation among districts/municipalities. Most recently, McCulloch and
Malesky (2010) exploit a new dataset of firm perceptions of the quality of economic governance
in 243 districts across Indonesia to estimate the impact of nine different dimensions of governance
on districts/municipalities growth. Surprisingly, they found relatively little evidence of a robust
relationship between the quality of governance and local economic performance.
Numerous studies above suggest that the local economic governance matters for the
regional economic performance. So, it is urgent for us to investigate the local economic
governance. For point of view of researchers, it is an important test for the validity of the New
Political and New Institutional Economics when confronted with the Neoclassical and Endogenous
Growth models. Policy makers, in turn, consider governance also as crucial issue and a new
dimension to the administration and policy studies and planning for countries globally.Moreover,
sub-national analysis of this kind is becoming increasingly relevant for policy as many countries
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move towards greater political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization. Indeed central
governments and donor agencies often have an explicit objective of improving governance at
the sub-national level on the grounds that this will improve local economic growth.
This paper contributes to the local government governance literature and empirics
particularly to Indonesia. Our approach is in the same spirit with Istiandari (2009) and McCulloch
and Malesky (2010), although it has three significant differences. First, we observe the governance
indices instead of estimating directly governance indicators to regional economic growth. Second,
we focus on the transition dynamics of relative governance indices using non parametricmethod
(i.e. Kernel density function) to identify the pattern of governance distribution across countries.
Third, we focus on the transition dynamics of relative governance distribution using Markov
chains. This paper also detects some particular changes in the movement of local economies
governance according to their index ranks. The use of Markov chains which intensively has
been employed in business research is intended to offer a deeper analysis of local economic
governance dynamics process in Indonesia.
III. METHODOLOGY
To have a better understanding about the shape of the relative local governance distribution or
how it evolved over the years in Indonesia, the Kernels of the actual relative local governance in
different time periods are estimated so that their shapes and inter-temporal dynamics can be
studied. A Kernel estimator of a set of observations √ in this case the relative rankings of the
local economic governance index √ is an estimated distribution function from which the
observations are likely to have been drawn (for details, see Silverman (1986)). Mathematically,
the Kernel estimator f(x) is defined as
f(x)  =  1/Nh Σj=1   ---->    N K  [(x – Xj)/h] (1)
where,
Xj =  data
N =  number of data points
h =   window width/smoothing parameter
K =  Kernel/weighting function (assumed to be the normal distribution in this paper)
The Kernel density estimation requires several steps (see Silverman, 1986). In the first
step, in each year, the sub-index of each district/municipality was re-scaled as a fraction of the
national average the associated sub-index, such that the distribution is restricted to lie in the
positive values. Since by construction, the national average sub-index is always 1 (100 percent).
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In the next step, for a suitably large number of points spanning the interval, the relative
frequency, i.e. the unconditional probability, with which each of these values could have occurred,
was estimated. The probability of each point was computed as the weighted average of the
distance of that points from the given relative incomes of all the regions, with the weights
drawn from a normal or Gaussian distribution centered at that point. Weights drawn from
anEpanechnikov distribution, which is the other frequently used weighting method, did not
seem to make any material difference to the shape of the estimated Kernels.
In the third step, the relative frequencies of these points were filtered for noise using the
procedure in Silverman (1986). The collection of the filtered relative frequencies formed the
Kernel of the relative local governance in that year. The area of the distribution was normalized
to 100 (percent). The Kernel estimators tell us how likely it is that governance score, on average,
was a certain fraction of national average governance score in a particular year.
As stated above, the Kernel density distribution is helpful to identify the shape of the
relative governance distribution or how it evolved over the years. But it can not predict each
transition probability of the distribution will converge toward each steady state. Markov chains
offer the transition probability of each distribution to achieve each steady state. Markov processes
can be considered as a special case of stochastic processes. They can be defined in continues of
discrete time and relate to a continuous or discrete set of states.
Following Amemiya (1985), a Markov model can be characterized by the following two
properties:
- A sequence of binary random variables taking the values yj(t) = 1 if the ith unit is the state
j at time t and yj(t) = 0 otherwise, for i = 1,...,n
If, in a discrete-time context, for each unit i, the distribution of the vector yj(t) depends fully
and only on yi(t-1), then the process is a first-order discrete-time Markov process.
- A set of transition probabilities,  in which pijk(t) denotes the probability of unit i  being in
the state j at time (t-1) and jumping to state k at time t. If the set of states is finite and
denumerable then all the transition probabilities may be ordered in the form of the so-
called Markov matrix. Pi = {pijk(t)}, in which the sum of all the element of a row will add up
to one.
Let p(t) be the vector describing the distribution of the units over the different states at
moment t. It holds of course that
(2)pj(t) = 1/n  Σi-1 ---> n  yij(t)
where n is the number of units. Such model is called a Markov chains.
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Furthermore, if the transition probabilities do not depend on time or on the unit, the
model is called homogenous and stationary. It can be shown that, under fairly general conditions,
there exists a uniquely defined long run, or «ergodic», matrix of transition probabilities  P   and
a corresponding vector of equilibrium probabilities associated to a stationary Markov chains.
More formally, if we denote the transition matrix by P = {pjk}, then the «ergodic» equilibrium
vector is π, verifying
8
In other words, in the long run the elements of the transition matrix will reach the state
of nature  j with probability πj, irrespective of the starting position. If we consider a finite
number of states (as determined, for example, by different levels of index rank), the shift of the
units among states can be easily traced and, therefore, the transition probability matrix can be
obtained.
This matrix will show the dynamic behavior of the units, since the transition matrix
expresses, roughly speaking, and the probability of a unit starting off in a particular state and
ending up in the same or in a different state. Notice that, by means of using first-order Markov
chains, it is implicitly assumed that all the relevant information about the past behavior of a
particular region is embedded in its fundamentals underlying the steady state towards which a
region converges are fairly stable over time.
We can apply, again following Amemiya (1985), the rule that the maximum likelihood
estimator of the transition probabilities can be computed as follows:
(3)           π = p’π
Such that
           πj >  0  and Σj    Eπj = 1
It follows that
          limt           pj(t) = πj8 (5)
(4)
Σsjk (t) ΣtΣi yij (t-1) yik (t)
Pjk = -------------    = -------------------------
ΣtΣk sjk (t) ΣtΣkΣi yij (t-1) yik (t)
(6)
in which sjk(t) denotes the number of units that have changed from state j to state k in period
t. The ergodic vector, that describes the index distribution of the units in the long run, is obtained
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by means of iterating the transition matrix. If the ergodic density vector has only one maximum,
it suggests some degree of convergence. Instead, if it tends to a bi-modal (or even tri-modal)
structure it may be pointing to some degree of polarization.
The nature of this analysis, however, suggests that results regarding the steady state
governance index distribution should be looked at with some caution. The computation of
long-run probabilities implicitly implies that historic probabilities will somehow carry over in the
future. In other words, there is no place for shocks to alter the course of this economy and
change the current trend. This surely is unrealistic; there is no reason to believe that institutions,
the rate of technological progress, the nature of human capital, and other crucial factors
determining local economic governance index will remain constant over time.
IV.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This paper used local economic governance data published by Commission of Regional Autonomy
Implementation Watch (Komisi Pengawas Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah, KPPOD). Since 2007,
the Asia Foundation, in conjunction with a national Indonesian NGO, KPPOD, has been launching
data set of firm perceptions which measures the quality of local economic governance in 243
districts across the country. The data is based on a statistically representative random sample of
over 12,000 firms and 729 business associations throughout these districts/municipalities. The
selected firms cover small (those have 10-19 workers), medium (those have 20-99 workers),
and large (those have more than 100 workers) industries. The proportion is 50, 45, and 5
percent respectively.
We use 2007 data and compared with the latest 2011 data. The Local economic
governance indicators used by KPPOD comprise 9 elements following World Bank (2005) criteria:
1. Land Accessibility
2. Business Licensing
3. Interaction between Local Government and Private Sector
4. Business Development Programmes
5. Capability and Integrity of Local Government Officials
6. Local Taxes and Local Retributions and other Transaction Costs
7. Infrastructure Management
8. Security and Conflict Resolution
9. Quality of Local Regulations
Each criterion then is calculated into sub-indicesrespectively as well as total index. In
constructing those indices KPPOD used judgment, analytical hierarchy process, and finalized
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Table 2 broke down further into two main characteristics of regions. Referring to the
main island, the average of total index of local economic governance in Java (64.32) is much
higher than that in outer Java (59.82). In 2011, it did not change. The local economic
governance index in Java increased faster than in outer Java. It seems that Java, where the
industry concentrate geographically, has relatively better local economic governance.
Consequently, it has a bad impact on the regional economic development equality as stated
by Mahi (2009).
Table 1.
Ten Top of Local Economic Governance Total Index Rank in 2007-2011
Rank 2007 2011
1 Blitar District 76.00 Blitar District 80.50
2 Magetan Municipality 75.40 Lampung Utara Municipality 79.00
3 Prabumulih District 74.70 Probolinggo District 78.40
4 Musi Banyu Asin Municipality 74.30 Batu District 76.30
5 Jembrana Municipality 73.70 Sorong Municipality 74.60
6 Tuban Municipality 73.40 Bangka Tengah Municipality 74.30
7 Lumajang Municipality 72.00 Magetan Municipality 73.90
8 Madiun Municipality 72.00 Probolinggo Municipality 73.80
9 Probolinggo District 71.50 Solok District 73.20
10 Gianyar Municipality 71.30 Padang Panjang District 73.10
Region Region
Source : KPPOD
by focus discussion group. Each index ranges from 0 to 100 points. The higher the index, the
better the governance is. Based on the total index, KPPOD then ranks all regions consecutively
as presented in Table 1. During 2007-2011, Blitar was the number one both in the two
periods. Magetan and Probolinggo also lied in ten top ranks.
Source : KPPOD (processed)
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics of Local Economic Governance Total Index 2007-2011
Java Outer Java District Municipality
61.70
6.38
188
62.12
7.43
202
61.75
6.62
55
65.94
5.95
43
59.82
6.76
141
61.79
7.23
199
64.32
4.85
102
67.11
6.12
46
Mean
Std. Dev
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev
Obs
2007
2011
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Based on the administrative region, the average of local economic governance in districts
(61.75) relatively equals to that in municipalities (61.70). However, in 2011, the average of
local economic governance in districts grew higher than that in municipalities, consistent with
study of Istiandari (2009). Moreover, the variability of the average of local economic governance
in municipalities was larger than that in districts indicated by higher standard deviation to
mean ratio. These imply that the unequal economic governance exist either in Java-outer Java
or in district-municipality, consistent with unequal regional income as found by Kuncoro and
Suryanto (2003).
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics the 9 sub-indices for 2007. The highest is score
on the Quality of Local Regulations (X9, 84.22). The two lowest score are on Business
Development Programs (X4, 43.04) and the Interaction between Local Government and Private
Sector (X5, 56.92). On the average the local economic governance total index is relatively
moderate about 61.72 and standard deviation is 6.42 points. Looking at the coefficient of
variation (CV, standard deviation to mean ratio), all of the indices do not vary around the mean
value.
Suource : KPPOD (processed)
Table 3.
Descriptive Statistics of Sub-Indices of Local Economic Governance 2007
Sub-Indices X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 Total
61.72
62.10
76.00
41.40
6.42
0.10
-0.43
3.08
7.62
0.0222
243
84.22
88.20
100.00
1.10
13.92
0.17
-1.93
8.87
499.92
0.0000
243
60.01
61.90
96.70
27.40
11.51
0.19
-0.18
2.87
1.52
0.4669
243
65.57
67.00
89.00
26.30
12.06
0.18
-0.59
2.98
14.30
0.0008
243
69.55
70.50
96.10
27.30
12.24
0.18
-0.32
2.94
4.13
0.1267
243
56.92
57.40
87.90
23.90
10.82
0.19
-0.09
3.57
3.62
0.1639
243
43.04
41.80
86.50
15.00
12.14
0.28
0.58
3.86
21.22
0.0000
243
55.42
55.40
80.10
26.30
9.84
0.18
-0.19
3.16
1.67
0.4337
243
59.95
60.00
84.60
32.20
8.33
0.14
-0.20
3.66
6.09
0.0475
243
71.26
71.70
99.40
39.70
10.25
0.14
-0.39
3.85
13.56
0.0011
243
Mean
Median
Max.
Min.
Std. Dev.
CV
Skewness
Kurtosis
J-B test
Prob.
Obs.
Table 3 also shows the shape of the distribution. All sub-indicess lightly skewed to the
left, as indicated  by the negative value of skewness (except X4, Business Development
Program). In terms of sharpness, the polygon frequency is likely to mesokurtic shape as shown
by the value of kurtosis around 3. The Quality of Local Regulations (X9) sub-index is an
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exception. The value of kurtosis is the highest, 8.87, displaying leptokurtic shape of its polygon
frequency.
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for 2011. The interesting thing is the average of
governance index of Local Taxes and Local Retributions and other Transaction Costs (X6)
currently it becomes the highest (81.28) in 2011 slightly higher than that of Quality of Local
Regulations (X9). It appears that there is a significant improvement for local governments to
revise their regulations. According to KPPOD (2011), during 2001-2010 the central government
(i.e. Ministry of Finance) assessed 13.252 local regulation drafts, 4.885 drafts were
recommended to Ministry of Home Affairs to be canceled. Ministry of Home Affair has already
officially canceled only 1.843 local regulations especially regarding taxes and levies regulations.
The remaining regional regulation drafts have not been decided yet whether canceled, held,
or suspended.
Note: The total sample is 245, 6 regions are incomplete for X9
Source: KPPOD (processed)
Table 4.
Descriptive Statistics of Sub-Indices of Local Economic Governance 2011
Sub-Indices X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 Total
Mean
Median
Max.
Min
Std. Dev.
CV
Skewness
Kurtosis
J-B test
Prob.
Obs.
73.77
74.90
94.30
41.80
11.23
0.15
-0.45
2.70
9.24
0.0099
245
62.22
61.80
84.60
31.10
8.57
0.14
-0.15
3.63
4.97
0.0831
245
50.94
50.70
80.10
25.00
9.91
0.19
0.12
3.24
1.13
0.5670
245
38.57
37.50
78.40
0.00
15.84
0.41
0.25
2.88
2.63
0.2686
245
81.28
82.50
100.00
44.20
10.77
0.13
-0.77
3.58
27.45
0.0000
245
69.18
71.00
94.00
29.50
12.94
0.19
-0.69
3.18
19.89
0.0000
245
67.06
68.70
94.20
2.40
12.28
0.18
-1.04
6.36
159.44
0.0000
245
81.13
83.80
100.00
31.60
11.19
0.14
-1.12
4.66
77.67
0.0000
239
62.76
63.40
80.50
39.40
7.31
0.12
-0.57
3.33
14.62
0.0007
245
50.90
51.60
89.80
14.90
12.52
0.25
0.06
3.34
1.28
0.5280
245
The next three lowest average of sub-indices are X4 (Business Development Programmes,
38.57),X3 (Interaction between Local Government and Private Sector, 50.90), and X5
(Capability and Integrity of Local Government Officials, 50.94). The latter is slightly similar to
that in 2007. They imply that capability and integrity of local government officials to interact
with private sectors in order to promote business are quite low even thoughthey have
successfully maintained security and conflict resolutions in their regions.
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The overall local economic governance index on the average is 62.76 in 2011, almost
close to 61.72 in 2007. In general, all sub-indicesandtotal index of local economic governance
during 2007-2011 tend to stagnate. Visual inspection of Kernel density as displayed in Figure 3
supports that preliminary conclusion. The non-parametric densities have been computed using
Gaussian Kernel, with optimal bandwidth selected for each case. In the starting year, the shape
is closely to be a normal distribution and the probability density is slightly right-skewed. It is also
notable that a local peak at the right of the mode, suggesting some degree of polarization for
this specific year.
In 2011, the progress experienced in the highest part of the distribution is noticeable,
since the probability mass has partly shifted slightly to the right. Even though the probability
mass has remained unchanged, two local peaks at the center now appear, suggesting that
some degree of polarization of the higher governance regions for this specific year was also
occurred. Basically, there is no significant difference between the shapes of local economic
governance total index distribution in 2007 and 2011. In general, almostallsub-indicesandthe
total index are normally distributed as indicated by the Jarque-Berra test as delivered previously
in Table 3 and 4.
Figure 3
Kernel Distribution of Local Economic Governance Total Index
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Table 5 presents the simple pair wise correlations matrix between the governance sub-
indices.The bottom-left part presents for 2007 and the upper-right part presents for 2011.
Almost all sub-indices being positively correlated with most of the other sub-indices, but,
usually negatively with the Business Development Programs sub-index. In 2007, for example,
sub-index X1 (Land Accessibility) is negatively correlated with X4 (Business Development
Program). This conditional so occurs in relation to sub-indices X4, X6, X7, X8, andX9. This
implies that the land remains areal obstacle for the economic developmen tin the area as
found by Mahi (2009).
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In 2011 the phenomena did not shift. Land Accessibility (X1) is still a serious constraint,
especially related toX4 as well as the Quality of Local Regulations(X9). The X4 was also significantly
negatively correlated with the X6 (Local Taxes and Local Retributions and other Transaction
Costs). The Quality of Local Regulations and Local Taxes and Levies are fully under the control
of local governments so that appropriate adjustments can be done immediately. This probably
means that the local government is less responsive in capturing the economic problems that
emerged int he own area.
The two highest positive correlations are X3 with X5 and X2 with X3 in 2007. In 2011 the
two highest positive correlations are X3 with X5 and X1 with X6. They inform us that Capability
and Integrity of Local Government Officials (X5) matters in relation to Interaction between
Local Government and Private Sector (X3) as well as Business Licensing (X2). The broader land
accessibility tends to increase the local tax and levies revenues.
Those large correlations suggest that it may be possible to summarize these governance
concepts with fewer variables. Moreover, the fact that one sub-index √ Business Development
Services √ is negatively correlated four other sub-indices is peculiar. Meanwhile, the small positive
correlations between these sub-indices since the concepts of governance inevitably overlap to
some extent (McCulloch and Malesky, 2010).
Note: the highlighted cells show the coefficient correlation in 2011.
Source: KPPOD, calculated.
Table 6.
Pair Wise Correlationbetween Sub-Indices of Local Economic Governance. 2007-2011
Sub-Indices X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
1.00
0.15
0.10
-0.37
0.18
0.45
0.24
0.46
0.12
0.22
1.00
0.55
0.16
0.51
0.24
0.33
0.44
0.00
0.23
0.38
1.00
0.20
0.78
0.24
0.10
0.43
-0.10
-0.30
0.21
0.22
1.00
0.12
-0.19
-0.09
-0.18
-0.04
0.28
0.20
0.69
0.06
1.00
0.31
0.23
0.43
-0.05
0.49
0.25
0.11
-0.23
0.15
1.00
0.32
0.53
0.08
0.16
0.42
0.35
0.13
0.26
0.07
1.00
0.31
0.07
0.48
0.33
0.38
-0.09
0.39
0.30
0.00
1.00
-0.03
-0.08
0.02
-0.04
0.00
-0.01
-0.04
0.02
0.00
1.00
So far, we have talked about the local economic governance in Indonesia within the
comparative statics frameworks. Isthe phenomenon of local economic governance in each
region as occurred in Tables 2 through 5 above temporary (that can still be changing in the long
term) or permanent in nature? Will there be a dramatic fundamental change in the local economic
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governance inaddressing theeconomic issuesthat emerge in each region? The lastsectionwill
answerthat questionmore forcefully.
To answer these questions, some adjustments are done. This is because the districts/
municipalities sampled by KPPOD in a particular year could not be covered again in the next
annual survey. For this reason, the selected regions are districts/municipalities that were sampled
in 2007 and also surveyed in 2011. In this circumstance, there are 62 selected districts/
municipalities. I then classify arbitrary them into four categories, (a) verygood (ranked 1-10), (b)
good (ranked 11-50), (c) fair (ranked 51-100), and (d) bad (ratings greater than 100). The
classification is carried out respectively for 2007 and 2011. The results are presented in Table 6
below.
Table 6 shows there are only three regions (as highlighted in Table 1, namely Blitar, Magetan,
and Probolinggo) that occupy the top ranking from 1 to 10 (state A) either in 2007or in 2011.
The classification B populated 6 regions with a rating of 11 to 50. The main diagonal from
upper-left to lower-rightis by itself, shows the degree of persistence in the relative position of
the district/municipalities is high, suggesting the permanent change of local economic
governance. This means that there were no significant increases in ratings more than 50 percent
(32 regions) of the observed districts/municipalities.
Notes: Figures in parentheses are probability
Source: KPPOD (processed)
Table 6.
The Observed Frequencies and Transition Matrix of Local Economic Governance Total Index
in Selected Districts/Municipalities. 2007-2011
2011
Y e a r
State A B C D Total
A
B
C
2007
D
Total
Ergodic
3 (0.5000)
1 (0.0714)
0 (0.0000)
0 (0.0000)
4
0.0233
0 (0.0000)
6 (0.4286)
3 (0.2000)
6 (0.2222)
15
0.1629
3 (0.5000)
2 (0.1429)
7 (0.4667)
4 (0.1482)
16
0.1454
0 (0.0000)
5 (0.3571)
5 (0.3333)
17 (0.6296)
27
0.2879
6
14
15
27
62
Only one region (Probolinggo municipality) that in 2007 still was in state B jumped to
category A. The other positive changes occurred for three regions. They in 2007 were able to
move to occupy from state C to state B in 2011. Four regions that originally were in category D
was able to ascend to the rank position of C in 2011. In fact, there are six regions that still in
classification D in 2007 can jump into the category B in 2011.
This contrasts with 15 other regions that experienced a decrease in their position. For
example, there are three regions in 2007 is located at position state A then decreased even into
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the predicate C. Overall, there are evidently no jumps from state D to A or C to A (or vice versa)
are visible ƒ there are no governance shift miracles in this sample ƒ and thus the degree of
mobility is limited to the better category, consistent with the study of McCulloch and Malesky
(2010).
The transition is assumed to continue to evolve through the mechanism of the Markov
chains until it reaches a steady state position. The last line of Table 6 presents the probability of
ergodic occurrence. The calculation result shows that there is little opportunity (2.33 percent)
in the long-term for the regions to keep staying in the ten top rankings. The probability  to
reach the category Band Care also relatively low, approximately 16.29 and 14.54 percent
respectively. This implies that the local government has not reached yet at the optimum level in
improving the regional economic governance, even though they already have been in the good
rankings.
The greatest probability is on the classification D(ranked in over 100). The probability
ofnot getting out from D positionis nearly 28.79 percent. The highest persistence in the lowest
state of regions should, no doubt, be a matter of concern for both academic and policy makers:
it may be hiding some kind of poor governance trap. It presents that because of structural
constrains those regions cannot grow as fast as others. As a result, their position remains
unchanged. Thus, tomove out from thepredicateof bad governance into a better category, it
requiresthe local government»s entrepreneurial touches tosolvethe excessive problems typically
occur in each region.
The current results agree with the intuitions obtained from the visual inspection of the
graphs above, since they do not predict polarization among districts/municipalities in the years
2007-2011 but, rather, some kind of concentration around the average values. Nevertheless,
these results may also suggest some sort of geographical externality, along the lines of Krugman
(1991a, 1991b). Spillovers among neighboring regions may foster the governance development
of the contiguous areas. In particular, when examining the region in the highest states in 2007
and 2011, a shift of the highest governance index were located to the west of the country can
be observed, such as Java, Sumatera, and Bali, while in the same period some well-off regions
were located in other areas. To sum up, all of theanalytical tools applied in this paper provide a
strong indicationthat there is no significant improvement of the local economic governance in
the case of district/municipalities in Indonesia.
V.  CONCLUSION
This paper tries toobserve thelocal economic governance in the case of districts/municipalities
in Indonesia through various measures of economic governance index. Observations for 2007
and 2011 showed that there were no significant changes in the performance of local economic
governance. The unchanged ingovernance of local economic performance due to land issues,
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business development programs, taxes and levies and other transaction costs, security, and
local regulations.
These results suggest improving the local economic governance to create conducive
investment climate to support the growth of economic activities. An industry in a particular
area will improve if the region has a favor investment climate. In terms of improving the
investment climate, the local governments should focus their economic development primarily
on providing the quality of infrastructur ein the area, especially land accessibility and business
development program. The central government can encourage some policies for national
infrastructure improvements and provide stimulation for the local government to give priority
to infrastructure provision.
Finally, it should be noted that the local economic governance is a necessary condition
for the creation of regional economic growth, but not a sufficient condition for the improvement
of regional economic performance. It seems that the local governance can be a source of
explanatory (symptoms) forregional economic growth, rather than the causes of regional
economic performance. This also confirms that the various efforts to improve local governance
require greater attention to understanding how the structural characteristics that makes up the
regional political economy which in turn affects the performance of the economy in line with
decentralization and regional autonomy.
The local economic governance particularly in Indonesia is still open and relevant to
analyze. This paper used two sample point data only. The further investigation can be done
using more sophisticated devises. Employing most recent time series data and applying, for
example, Markov chains method for continuous variable, are advisable so that the transition
dynamics of local economic governance will be more accurate for policy makers to address the
related problems.
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